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Introduction 
 
Social indicators and gender statistics reveal that women in the SEM countries suffer from 
conditions of disadvantage if compared to men, and to both men and women from other 
regions of the world.  
 
SEM women are on average more disadvantaged economically, politically, and socially than 
are women in other regions. In particular, SEM women are more disadvantaged than women 
in regions with similar income levels or at similar stages of economic development (e.g., 
Latin America, Southeast Asia, East Asia).
1
 Similar conditions are present when it comes to 
other gender related statistics such as women’s earned income, literacy and educational 
attainment rates. Women also are under-represented in governance and decision-making 
positions.
2
  
 
Many Arab countries have in place family laws – also known as personal status codes – that 
confer upon women the status of dependent and minor with respect to marriage, divorce, child 
custody, and inheritance. Because of these family laws, States that have signed the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women have done so 
with significant reservations.
3
 Broadly speaking, women remain associated primarily with 
their family roles, and the cumulative effect is gender-based discrimination and second-class 
citizenship for women, albeit in varying degrees across the countries of the region.   
 
At the same time, since at least the early 1980s, issues pertaining to women and the family 
have been highly politicised, partly due to Islam’s cultural and political revival. One 
manifestation has been the re-emergence or expansion of hijab (Islamic dress, or veiling) in 
countries such as Egypt, which led to spirited debates among different sectors of public 
opinion in the 1980s and 1990s concerning the meaning of this phenomenon. Another was the 
stricter application of Muslim family laws by the state, partly to placate Islamist movements 
or revive state legitimacy. The revival of Islam cannot be understood if placed outside of a 
broader dynamic of political liberalisation, which spread all around the SEM region as a 
consequence of the conditional loans that most SEM countries were getting from the IMF or 
                                                        
1
 UNDP, http://hdr.undp.org/fr/content/towards-gender-equality-arabmiddle-east-region. For an overview of 
women’s condition see Moghadam, Valentine M., ed. From patriarchy to empowerment: women's participation, 
movements, and rights in the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia. Syracuse University Press, 2007. 
2
 http://www.quotaproject.org/publications/arab_quota_report.pdf   
3
 Report: CEDAW and Muslim Family Law, 2011, 
http://www.musawah.org/sites/default/files/CEDAW%20%26%20Muslim%20Family%20Laws_0.pdf , see also 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CEDAW/Pages/CEDAWIndex.aspx  
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WB. In the 1980 and 90s, most countries were obliged to partially legalise multi-party 
systems and to integrate Muslim groups in the political game (traditionally, Islamist groups 
have been repressed in the SEM countries). Few governments even tolerated Islamist parties, 
albeit widespread fear of Islamism was spread in the region especially as a consequence of the 
Algerian civil war. The 9/11 events further complicated the scenario as Islamist groups further 
fragmented, with the majority of them moderating themselves to be easily distinguishable 
from terrorists and radical Islamist groups. This is the case for instance of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, which has been cyclically repressed and tolerated by Egyptian governments; the 
PJD, the moderate Moroccan Islamist party which has been integrated in the political game at 
cost of moderating their positions; partly of Hezbollah, which is however a very particular 
case with peculiar, national dynamics. The reform of family/personal status code has often 
represented the ‘bargain chip’ for political integration of Islamist parties.  
 
As a consequence of this Islamic revival and the integration (assimilation) of Islamist groups 
in institutional politics, new debates spread in the region, originating new interpretations of 
concept such as for instance ‘human rights’ and ‘women’s rights’. In opposition to ‘Western’ 
conceptions of women’s rights and human rights (with their emphasis on individual 
autonomy, choice, agency, and rights), generally speaking the idea of ‘Islamic’ women’s 
rights and human rights has been advanced, with an emphasis on respect for family, religion, 
and community. This does not mean that women in the SEM countries are merely oppressed 
and repressed, as many women engage debates about women’s position in society, about the 
nature and pathways toward women’s emancipation, and about the meaning of feminism 
and/or women’s activism, originating very innovative and original reflections on this (i.e. 
‘Islamic feminism’).  
 
However, it is quite evident that women are, according to socio-indicators, disadvantaged 
when it comes to labour market, employment opportunities and education. 
 
This should not hinder however two elements. The first is the effort that women’s 
organisations throughout the region have been doing to ‘fix’ those disadvantages. Women’s 
organisations (a very diversified universe in itself, where the cleavage secular vs religious 
feminism is very strong even if it does not prevent women’s groups to form united coalitions 
when particular issues are at stake
4
) adopt different strategies to make their voices lauder. 
Women’s collective action ranges from consensus-building (e.g., Jordan, Egypt) to 
confrontational (e.g., Algeria), and that Arab feminism’s relationship to the state also varies. 
State responses to feminist activism have ranged from indifference (e.g., Palestine Authority, 
Lebanon) to hostility (Saudi Arabia, Egypt) to receptive (Algeria, Morocco), with a number of 
states now actively promoting women’s rights and implementing legal reforms (Algeria, 
Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia).  
 
The second element is that SEM countries present very varied conditions in terms of formal 
protection of women’s rights and, of course, in terms of substantial implementation of those 
protective and emancipating measures. We range from countries such as Turkey, where 
historically the secular nature of the state has been guaranteeing formal rights to women, to 
                                                        
4
 Labidi, Lilia. "The Nature of Transnational Alliances in Women's Associations in the Maghreb: The Case of 
AFTURD and ATFD." Journal of Middle East Women's Studies 3.1 (2007): 6-34. See also Salih, Ruba. 
"Transnational Public Spheres from'Above'and from'Below': Feminist Networks across the Middle East and 
Europe." Anthropology of the Middle East 5.1 (2010). 
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countries where a stricter approach is adopted. In the recent years, a number of countries have 
undertaken reforms of the personal code, engendering innovative and broader dynamics 
connected to the survival of authoritarian governments and regimes. Those reforms are indeed 
a good example of how women’s rights may paradoxically serve instrumental goals, such as a 
façade maquillage of authoritarianism, and co-option relevant women’s groups. This was the 
case for the reform of the family and personal law in Morocco (the Mouddawana reform) 
whereby the monarchy succeeded in appeasing transnational feminist groups, national 
feminist groups, international actors (such as the EU, whose loans and trade support were 
conditioned by the reform of the family law in a more progressive direction) and in co-opting 
national political and social forces (notably, this was the case of the Islamist party PJD
5
). 
 
Women’s disadvantage position is rooted in social, cultural, economic factors, as well as in 
the legal framework. The analysis of women’s status requires a multidisciplinary approach, it 
is not a one a single aspect (i.e. the economic factor, or the cultural factor) that explain their 
unequal access to power and their lower status. In this chapter, we focus on the social, 
economic and cultural level, and we point out the main factors hampering or enabling young 
women’s empowerment and gender equality.  
 
 
Women’s presence in the labour market 
 
Women’s presence in the labour market is a key issue when it comes to the analysis of 
women’s status and the conditions of their empowerment. It is a field of conflicting 
tendencies. One the one hand, there has been a growing inclusion of women in the labour 
market in the last decades. On the other hand, deep gender inequalities persist in the access to 
job market, in working conditions, the level of salaries (women earn less despite labour laws 
that mandate equal pay and equal opportunities) and the access to higher professional 
positions.   
For instance, table 1 shows the gender gap in the employment rate among total population, 
and in the unemployment rates among young people. 
  
Table 1.  Gender, employment and unemployment (2011-2014) 
 Algeria Morocco Tunisia  Egypt Lebanon 
Employment 
rate* 
Total: 40% 
Male: 66% 
Female: 
12,3% 
Tot: 45.79% 
Male: 69.1% 
Female: 23.7% 
n.a 
 
Tot: 43% 
Male: 69% 
Female: 17% 
Tot: 43% 
Male: 64.69% 
Female: 
20.39% 
Youth 
unemployment 
rate ** 
Youth, total: 
28% 
Male: 19.1% 
Female: 
38.2% 
Youth, tot: 
18.6% 
Male: 18.4% 
Female: 19.2% 
Youth, tot: 
42.3% 
Male: n.a 
Female: n.a 
Youth, tot: 
25% 
Male: 14.7% 
Female: 54.1% 
Youth, tot: 
16.8% 
Male: 14.6% 
Female: 
22.3% 
 
* Source: International Labour Organization, Key Indicators of the Labour Market database. Year: 2012 
                                                        
5
 Serida Catalano ‘Islamists and the regime: Applying a new framework for analysis to the case of Family Code 
reforms in Morocco’, Party Politics, 19, 2013; and Cavatorta and Dalmasso ‘Liberal outcomes through 
undemocratic means. The reform of the Code du Statut Personnel in Morocco’, The Journal of Modern African 
Studies, Vol. 47, No. 4, 2009, pp. 487-506 
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Employment to population ratio is the proportion of a country's population that is employed. Ages 15 and older 
are generally considered the working-age population. 
** Sources: CIA World Factbook. Year: 2014, estimated. Tunisia: year 2011 
 
In a nutshell, there are growing opportunities for women in the economic and paid-work 
sphere, but still many constraints and disadvantages, if compared to men. There are also 
relevant differences between formal equal rights between men and women in the labour 
market, and the actual situation of discrimination on the ground, that are worth to be better 
explored.  
In this frame, it is interesting to analyze the women’s coping strategies in this field: how do 
women and young women in particular, deal with the opportunities and constraints in this 
field? Besides that, our analysis should focus on the consequences of these conflicting 
tendencies on the individual biographies of young women. It is important to take into account 
that these consequences vary a lot depending on the conditions of inclusion into the paid-work 
and on the internal cleavages (i.e., informal vs formal work; public vs private sector; low-paid 
instable jobs vs well-paid jobs) that contribute to differentiate women’s position within the 
labour market. Therefore, special attention should be paid to these internal differences, and 
also to the policies and measures that are implemented, or could be implemented, in order to 
promote a better position in the labour market for women in different situations (eg  low-class 
and middle class, high and low levels of education, women with different care loads and 
family responsibilities etc.).  
Another possible contradiction to be explored here concerns the circumstances and conditions 
under which employment reveals to be a mean of emancipation for young women. This 
question has been already discussed in the case of Iran, where it has been noted that:  
‘However, even though the percentage of female employment has increased and to some 
extent this has been the result of neo-liberal economic policies, this increase cannot be 
assumed to be indicative of female economic empowerment. Iranian women’s employment 
patterns resemble the global trends in female work. The percentage of women in the labour 
force has increased with the spread of neo-liberal economic policies but also has the level of 
female poverty. Throughout the Third World, as more jobs become less well paid, seasonal, 
and unprotected by laws and regulation, more women enter into paid employment. 
Additionally, more women have to work as inflation increases and government subsidies for 
basic services are reduced.”6. We should explore whether there is any similar pattern in the 
case of SEM countries. 
 
  
Gender and education 
 
Education is one of the main fields where deep transformations have taken place in the last 
decades, with a deep impact on the living conditions and opportunities of young people, and 
of women. Until the late 1970s, the region had one of the highest illiteracy rates in the world 
compared with other less-developed nations. In the last decades, literacy rate and female 
literacy rate have grown. Today, almost all the countries in the region report that nearly all of 
their children (both boys and girls) are enrolled in primary school. Women have made gains 
in access to education, literacy, university enrolment, and the variety of academic fields 
                                                        
6
 Bahramitash, Roksana. "Market fundamentalism versus religious fundamentalism: women's employment in 
Iran." Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies 13.1 (2004): 44. 
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available to them. Today, levels of female education are on the raise, even if they remain 
lower than the male ones (table 2). 
 
 
Table 2 – Literacy rate and expected years of schooling  
 
 Algeria Morocco Tunisia Egypt Lebanon 
Literacy 
rate
*
 (total 
population) 
Total 
population: 
72.6% 
male: 81.3% 
female: 63.9% 
Total 
population: 
67.1% 
male: 76.1% 
female: 57.6% 
Total 
population: 
79.1%  
male: 87.4%  
female: 71.1%  
 
Total 
population: 
73.9% 
male: 81.7% 
female: 65.8% 
Total 
population: 
89.6% 
Male: 93.4% 
female: 86% 
Expected 
years of 
school ** 
Male: 13,4 
Female: 13,8  
 
Male: 11.6 
Female: 10.6  
 
Male:  14  
Female: 15  
 
Male: 12  
Female: 13  
Male:13,25 
Female: 12.85 
 
 
* Source: CIA world Factbook. Year: 2006, Algeria; 2012, estimated, Morocco; 2010, estimated, Tunisia; 2011, 
estimated, Egypt; 2011 estimated, Lebanon. Adult (15+) literacy rate (%). Total is the percentage of the 
population age 15 and above who can, with understanding, read and write a short, simple statement on their 
everyday life. Generally, ‘literacy’ also encompasses ‘numeracy’, the ability to make simple arithmetic 
calculations. This indicator is calculated by dividing the number of literates aged 15 years and over by the 
corresponding age group population and multiplying the result by 100 
** Sources: United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Institute for Statistics. 
Year: 2010. Tunisia: 2011. Expected years of schooling is the number of years a child of school entrance age is 
expect to spend at school, or university, including years spent on repetition. It is the sum of the age-specific 
enrolment ratios for primary, secondary, post-secondary non-tertiary and tertiary education. 
 
 
The benefits of female education on women’s condition, on gender equality and, more 
broadly, on the entire society, have been demonstrated by an extensive literature. For instance, 
Roudi and Moghadam (2003) list the benefits as follows:  
 
 As female education rises, fertility, population growth, and infant and child mortality 
fall and family health improves. 
 Increases in girls’ secondary school enrolment are associated with increases in 
women’s participation in the labour force and their contributions to household and 
national income. 
 Women’s increased earning capacity, in turn, has a positive effect on child nutrition. 
 Children—especially daughters—of educated mothers are more likely to be enrolled in 
school and to have higher levels of educational attainment. 
 Educated women are more politically active and better informed about their legal 
rights and how to exercise them. 
 
However, more research is needed in order to assess which is the configuration of these 
patterns in SEM countries – in different countries and different social classes. In a context of 
economic difficulty, do these patterns follow the same logic, or is their functioning changed 
by those structural constraints? What is the role of social class background? How the 
professional integration of women goes hand-by-hand with the international division of labour 
according to sex and race? 
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The difficult transition from school to work by young people, and especially young women, 
seems to undermine in part the beneficial effects of education. Women still face many 
constraints and strong discrimination in their access to employment and in finding their first 
job (even if they have high levels of credential and qualification). This gap between high 
expectations and low opportunities could be seen as one of the main contradictions that young 
women are now facing in these countries, to some extent contributing to reduce differences 
between the living experiences of young women in SEM countries and European countries.  
There are contradictory elements and different interpretations on the effective linkage 
between the growth of female education and the improvement of women’s social and 
economic status in SEM countries, as Haghighat (2010: 56) explains: “If women are educated 
but not given much access to political and economic power, the process of empowerment is 
not complete and therefore their status stays low despite higher investment on their human 
capital”.   
 
Moreover, the growth of female education has been read as an indicator of a general shift in 
social values related to the relevance of education for women and, more broadly, of the 
transformation of the cultural values and orientations related to women’s role and position in 
society (mostly defined by the association to their family role, or also in reference to their role 
in the public sphere, professional role, etc). 
On the other hand, different researches suggest that young women and their families often 
seem to spend their high education as symbolic resources in the marriage rather than in the 
labour market. In this way, high level of education turns to be a credential to find a good 
marriage, to achieve a better social and financial status through marriage. This would reveal 
that the growing interest in women’s education is not always an indicator of a change in the 
cultural values and orientations of their family (or of the young women themselves). It would 
also reveal that the path to women’s social mobility and status still tend to depend more on the 
dependence to a male figure than on women’s resources and skills.  
 
For these reasons, among the questions related to education, youth and gender (addressed in 
WP2) we suggest to include a special attention to the dimension of expectations, exploring the 
factors that shape the expectations of young women, and their families, in relation to 
education, and how they are changing in the current period of social, political transformations. 
A second relevant focus of our analysis entails the consequences of education for different 
subjects. We would like to understand the role that education plays in the lives of young 
women, compared with young men, in different contexts. When exploring this issue, it is 
important to pay attention to the dimension of class, and urban/rural residence, and to avoid 
focusing only on higher educated girls, on high and middle class urban youth etc. We should 
ask: where is the class element here? How does class mark a difference in the way education 
is experienced by young women (and men) and in the strategic use of the educational 
qualification? Do low class and middle class or poor women attach different expectations to 
education?  (e.g. Richer girls are expected to study more and marry some peer-rich guy. After 
that, they are not expected to go to work. After getting university degrees, poorer or low 
middle class girls must work…) 
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Trends in family formation and marriage in the Arab world 
 
Family formation and marriage in the Arab world are undergoing relevant changes as new 
patterns of biographical transition are taking root in the region. First of all, early marriage is 
no longer as popular as it was in the past. The average age of both men and women marrying 
has significantly raised, and this reality is of particular interest and relevance in the case of 
women specifically. More and more women are staying at their parental house longer and 
some of them do not marry at all. Table 3 shows this trend, providing data on women’s 
average marriage age in 2011, and on women’s average age at the first birth in the previous 
decade. When it comes to fertility, rates and the number of birth per woman have also 
significantly dropped (Table 3). 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3– Marriage and parenting: gender dimensions  
 Algeria Morocco Tunisia Egypt Lebanon 
Fertility rate, 
total (births 
per woman)* 
2.78  2.15 2 2.87 1.74 
Age at first 
birth  
(different 
years, 1992-
2008) ** 
Female 
(1992): 24.9 
Female 
(2003): 25.4 
Female (1988): 
24.5  
Female (2008): 
22.9 
 
Marriage age  
(2011) *** 
Female 
(2011): 29.6 
Female 
(2011): 26.4 
Female (2001): 
25**** 
 
 
Female (2011): 
23.6 
 
 
Female 
(2011):: 
27***** 
 
 
* Sources: United Nations Population Division. World Population Prospects; United Nations Statistical Division. 
Population and Vital Statistics Report.  Year: 2012. Total fertility rate represents the number of children that 
would be born to a woman if she were to live to the end of her childbearing years and bear children in 
accordance with current age-specific fertility rates. 
** United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Fertility Report 
2012. Year: 1992 Algeria; 2003-2004 Morocco; 1988 Tunisia; 2008 Egypt;  
*** Olmsted, Jennifer C. "Norms, economic conditions and household formation: A case study of the Arab 
world." The History of the Family 16.4 (2011): 401-415.  
**** United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Fertility Report 
2012. Year: 2001 
*****Sources: Estimated from Carmichael, Sarah. "Marriage and power: Age at first marriage and spousal age 
gap in lesser developed countries." The History of the Family 16.4 (2011): 416-436. 
 
 
These transformations are linked to broader socio-economic changes that are taking place in 
the region. Arab and SEM economies have increasingly moved away from an agrarian 
system, which supported both early marriage and extended families. The majority of the Arab 
world’s population lives in cities and is involved in the industrial or service sectors. Arab 
youth are more educated compared with previous generations, and young Arab women are 
more likely to work outside their homes in paying jobs. These changes challenge women’s 
Institutions, Law and Practices Hampering Women Engagement (II) 
 
 
9 
traditional roles in the household and society as a whole. Understanding how Arab marriage 
patterns are changing is now particularly important because Arab countries are seeing 
unprecedented numbers of young adults entering their 20s, when the great majority of people 
worldwide marry and start families.
7
  
 
Women throughout the Arab region once typically married in their teens or early 20s. In 
recent decades, however, early marriage has declined sharply in parts of the region (Libya and 
UAE in particular). In Tunisia, Algeria, and Lebanon, only 1 percent to 4 percent of women 
ages 15 to 19 are married, and the percentage of women ages 35 to 39 who have never 
married in these countries now ranges from 15 percent to 21 percent. The percentage of 
women ages 35 to 39 who have never married is a good indicator for measuring changes in 
the universality of marriage, because the likelihood of a single woman marrying after age 40 
is quite low (table 5). Despite the lack of statistics and data, another relevant phenomenon is 
the one of marriage-age gap (women commonly marrying older men) which is particularly 
pronounced in Arab societies. It is calculated that one-quarter of recent marriages in Egypt 
and Lebanon had women at least 10 years younger than their husbands.
8
  
 
What are the reasons for the delay in marriage? And what are the consequences? 
 
Causes 
 
Economic condition: high rate of unemployment and the fragmentation of the social contract 
between the state and the people in the Arab world before the introduction of neoliberal 
reforms in late 1970s have worsened the economic condition of significant segment of 
society. Unemployment is quite significant and marriage is quite expensive. Arab young men 
in their 20s commonly say that they are saving now in order to be able to marry some years in 
the future. Unfortunately, young people in the Arab world face a tough economic situation. 
They appear to be the first generation of young people in the recent history of the region that 
does not necessarily expect to fare better economically than their parents, despite having the 
largest increase in education attainment over their parents of any Arab generation.  what 
consequences in terms of youth cultures? 
 
Raising education: Levels of female education are on the raise, even if they remain lower than 
male level of education in SEM countries. Education and marriage and family formation are 
interconnected because women are expected to study more and, consequently to delay their 
marriage and formation of their own family. Education then is considered as a cause of 
women’s emancipation.  is it really like this? Or is it the other way around, namely that 
delay of marriage (caused by the structural variables mentioned) has the effect of pushing 
women towards education as a viable alternative to marriage?  
  
 
Female employment: Studies show that when women have the opportunity to earn their own 
incomes, they tend to delay marriage and parenthood and hence bear fewer children in their 
                                                        
7
 Nearly one in every five Egyptians is between ages 20 and 29, and the United Nations projects that the 
population in this age group will grow by 20 percent between 2005 and 2025, from 13.5 million to 16.3 million 
(source: Rashad, Hoda, et al. "Marriage in the Arab world." Health for the Millions 29.1 (2004): 38-41.) 
8
 Special tabulation done by the Social Research Center at the American University in Cairo using the Egypt 
Demographic and Health Survey (2003) and the Lebanon Maternal and Child Health Survey (1996). 
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lifetime.
9
 Employment has an effect on fertility in both directions - women may choose not to 
work if they have children, and for women who are working, it may influence the number of 
children they choose to have. Social and cultural changes such as a decline in fertility rates, an 
increase in age at marriage, and a demand for more educated men and women, all contribute 
to a larger supply of younger women who are, at least, temporarily freed from family 
responsibilities (i.e., early marriage, subsequent pregnancies, child care responsibilities, 
housework) and therefore more available to be employed. However, as suggested previously, 
the effective consequences of this trend in terms of women’s emancipation, largely depend on 
the working conditions and the sector of employment (e.g.  formal vs informal labour market, 
well-paid vs low-paid jobs, etc.), as well as on the presence and effectiveness of public and 
private interventions sustaining a fair redistribution of family and work responsibilities 
between men and women.  
 
 
Consequences 
 
The nexus marriage-fertility: As highlighted by Elhum Haqiqat,
10
 early age at marriage does 
not always correspond with high fertility. For example, in 2002, about 60 percent of women 
under age twenty-five (between the ages of fifteen and nineteen, group I; and twenty and 
twenty-four, group II) were married in the MENA region (table 4). In Egypt (group I: 12 
percent, group I I: 53 percent) and Turkey (group I : 15 percent, group II: 59 percent) a high 
percentage of women under age twenty-five were married (table 4), and yet these two 
countries’ total fertility rates (TFRs) were not as high as expected - 3.5 for Egypt and 2.5 for 
Turkey (see table 4). If women getting married at a young age correlates to families having 
more children, then Egypt and Turkey should have much higher fertility rates. The 
inconsistencies in these patterns are an indicator of the complex relationships among fertility 
patterns, marriage practices, and women’s status in MENA societies. 
 
Women’s status: In Arab societies, women’s status is mainly defined by their roles as mothers 
and wives. By ‘failing’ to meet these expectations, single women do not have an easily 
defined or comfortable niche in society. Single women with no education or job skills face 
particular problems in the Arab world because of their lack of financial independence. 
However, increasing numbers of Arab women are single, forcing their societies to grapple 
with a ‘new’ category of women. Successful career women are more likely to escape from the 
traditional stereotype and find opportunities for self-fulfilment beyond the roles of mother and 
wife. These women are no longer necessarily portrayed by their family members and society 
as failures for being unable to secure a partner. Indeed, they are increasingly characterised 
either as having made a choice to remain single or (at the very least) as good women unable to 
find a partner because of a limited pool of suitable candidates.  
 
These changes raise a number of important questions in relation to youth and young women 
A first, fundamental question regards the impact of these changes on young women’s identity 
and roles: What kind of values and orientation do women express in relation to work, 
education formation of a family and motherhood? What kind of value and relevance do they 
                                                        
9
 Brewster, Karin, and Roland Rindfuss. 2000. “Fertility and Women’s Employment in Industrialized Nations.” 
Annual Review of Sociology, 26, 271–296. 
10
 Haghighat-Sordellini, Elhum. Women in the Middle East and North Africa: change and continuity. Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010 
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attribute to these personal goals and life choices, to these different parts of their biographical 
projects? Do their expectations and identities continue to construct around family roles 
(mothering, marriage) or also around public roles (education, work, political participation)? 
Do they imagine and seek their self-fulfilment in relation mostly to traditional roles in the 
private/family sphere (motherhood..) or also pursuing education – professional goals? How do 
they cope with these different goals and source of identity and biographical project? 
Which are the differences and continuities under this point of view with the previous 
generations? Are new gender models and identity arising in younger female generations? 
 
The second question regards the impact of the delayed marriage for young women and for 
young men. We would like to explore how the changes in marriage and parenting 
(fundamental markers of transition to adulthood) affect the cultural construction and 
definition of youth. Do they leave to new social expectations and norms that guide the 
behaviours and role for young men, and women, in society? How is this “prolonged youth” 
perceived by young people (men and women) and by adult society? As a stage of limbo or as 
a new condition? Which differences between young men and women in relation to this?  
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Table 4. Percentage of married women for age 
 
Source: Haghighat-Sordellini, Elhum. Women in the Middle East and North Africa: change and 
continuity. Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, p. 64. 
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Table 5. Marriage patterns 
 
Source: Rashad, Hoda, et al. "Marriage in the Arab world." Health for the Millions 29.1 (2004):3 
 
 
 
Table 6 – Gender and health   
 Algeria Morocco Tunisia Egypt Lebanon 
Life 
expectancy*  
male: 75.12 
years 
female: 77.72 
years 
male: 73.44 
years 
female: 79.74 
years 
male:  73.6 
years 
female:  77.9 
years 
 
male: 70.82 
years 
female: 76.2 
years 
male: 76.03 
years 
female: 78.46 
y 
Child 
mortality 
(deaths/1,000 
live births) * 
Total 
population: 
21.76  
male: 23.54 
Total 
population: 
24.52  
male: 28.96  
Total 
population: 
23.19  
male: 26.63  
Total 
population: 
22.41  
male: 23.9  
Total 
population: 
7.98  
male: 8.4  
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female: 19.9  female: 19.87  female: 19.51  female: 20.84  female: 7.53  
Maternal 
mortality 
rate** 
97 
deaths/100,000 
live births 
 56 
deaths/100,000 
live births 
66 
deaths/100,000 
live births 
25 
deaths/100,000 
live births 
 
Source: * CIA World Factbook. Year: 2014 estimated  
** CIA World Factbook. Year: 2010 
 
 
Final remarks  
 
Considering what has been outlined in this paper, few general remarks are made here by 
answering some of the most relevant questions asked by the project (Sahwa). 
 
Why is gender a relevant topic to understand youth realities in Arab countries? 
 
Gender politics and, among them, politics for women’s empowerment, are very much ‘on the 
move’ in the SEM countries, particularly after the so-called Arab Spring. There are ‘new’ 
findings pointing out that there is a shift in the women’s rights question from state-defined 
action to atomised and autonomous forms of activism.
11
 This is in line with the finding from 
the study of activism, informal politics and social non-movement as inherently political, 
despite their apparently non-political characteristics (see our background paper on youth 
cultures). Politics is no longer controlled by a single party, set of state actors or a by a single 
man. Rather, it has increasingly taken the form of popular ‘activisms’, rejecting state-imposed 
binaries such as state/society in favour of non-institutional forms of political intervention and 
contestation. The call for gender dignity and justice, in this new period, echoes the style, 
media and dynamics of Arab Spring politics more broadly. Despite being recognised by the 
scholar, these dynamics of autonomy of activism and women’s activism in particular deserve 
further examination.  
 
Beyond analysing the impact of structural variables (employment, education…) on activating 
women politically, it should also be analysed how gender impacts on the practice activism. Is 
there a specific way/style SEM women adopt when struggling for the improvement of their 
condition?  How did it happen that those women took part in the protests, and there was any 
specific style of activism they had? Female informal workers or poor women could offer a 
privileged point of observation for wider dynamics of political empowerment. 
 
Many ‘venues’ can be observed to make sense of the autonomisation of politics and activism: 
informal activists’ groups, website and blogs ethnography, ethnography of alternative 
music/artistic scene, university campuses and policy-making processes
12
. 
                                                        
11
 Singerman, Diane. "Youth, Gender, and Dignity in the Egyptian Uprising." Journal of Middle East Women's 
Studies 9.3 (2013): 1-27. Le Renard, Amélie. "Young Urban Saudi Women's Transgressions of Official Rules 
and the Production of a New Social Group." Journal of Middle East Women's Studies 9.3 (2013): 108-135. 
12 Ben Salem, Maryam “Traditional and new forms of young women political engagement in transitional 
context” CAWTAR, 2013.  
Institutions, Law and Practices Hampering Women Engagement (II) 
 
 
15 
 
To identify where is the knowledge on the issue (specifically in relation to youth and gender), 
what are the gaps in the studies? 
 
Major gaps revolve around: the culture that comes with women’s activism; the production of 
new forms of contestation and contentious politics (culture and practice); the impact of 
changing structural variables on women’s living conditions; the urban/rural cleavage.  
 
The impact of changing structural variables. In particular, economic liberalization has brought 
new job opportunities to the region and even though the percentage of female employment 
has increased, it is debated whether this increase could be assumed to be indicative of female 
economic empowerment. The percentage of women in the labour force has increased with the 
popularity of neo-liberal economic policies but so has the level of female poverty
13
. 
Throughout the Third World, as more jobs become less well paid, seasonal, and unprotected 
by laws and regulation, more women enter into paid employment. Additionally, more women 
have to work as inflation increases and government subsidies for basic services are reduced. 
What is the consequence of this, in terms of women’s emancipation and autonomy? 
 
The urban/rural cleavage. It is often assumed that rural communities are more traditional and 
less involved in social transformations. However, the ‘Arab uprisings’ started from rural and 
peripheral towns – although it is true that it is only when protests spread in the capital, they 
reached the apex of strength. However, this is not valid for Turkey where the so-called ‘Gezi 
protest’ took place in big cities first and then in smaller cities. Again, it is very important here 
to keep in mind that such thing as ‘the SEM countries’ does not really exist and that there are 
relevant, internal differences. For instance, some countries are more urbanized than others.
14
 
Broadly speaking, more focus could be devoted to the study of rural areas and social changes 
happening there, as well as the study if the suburban zones with their specific cultures and 
practices. 
The spread of university branches beyond the biggest cities in the country could, for instance, 
signal that relevant dynamics are also taking place in more rural settings. For instance, they 
reveal a new internal demand for high education, from small cities, rural and suburban areas
15
. 
How those dynamics impact on gender-construction and on broader structural variables 
(employment, education….)? 
 
Centre/periphery axis. Capitals in SEM countries hardly are the only political and economic 
centre of their countries. And city centres hardly are the only place to be to grasp relevant 
socio-political dynamics. Poor neighbourhoods and satellite cities deserve more attention. In 
this case, a relatively understudied issue is informal economy and the gendering of that 
economic (non-)sector. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Available at http://www.cawtar.org/upload/telechargement/Resume_Cawtar_Anglais_V22.pdf 
13 CAWTAR, “Gender Impact of Trade Liberalization in the MENA Region”, 2006; 
14
 For instance: Morocco (Pop: 31,968,361 ab, Urb rate: 58%), Egypt (Pop: 80.000.000 ab., Urb rate: 49%), 
Lebanon (Pop: 4,140,289, Urb rate: 78%), Turkey (Pop: 79.790,000, Urb tax: 70%). 
15
 Many of the students and scholars in SEM countries are coming from rural and sub urban zones, while 
students from the richer sectors of urban population can afford education in foreign universities.   
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To provide a gender approach to the research themes of SAHWA so as to orient their 
research (Education, Employment and Social Inclusion, Political Participation and 
Mobilization, Youth Cultures and Values, International Migration and Mobility and 
International Cooperation and Public Policies). To formulate research questions 
‘genderising’ those five topics. 
 
It is very important to highlight the differences among the SEM countries: Tunisia is not 
Morocco, Algeria is not Lebanon…. 
 
 
Education, employment and social inclusion (WP2) 
 
Education: 
Which role does education play in the lives of young women (compared to young men)? How 
the new opportunities in education for girl are impacting on their social position, and on their 
identity?  Which are the expectation of young women and their families (compared to young 
men), to what extent are they full filled? Is higher and more widespread education indicative 
of women’s emancipation? Does higher education indicate women’s emancipation or is 
university a sort of ‘parking’ for girls who cannot find a job? Is there a class element there? 
How does class mark a difference in the way education is experienced by young women (and 
men) and in the strategic use of the educational qualification? 
 
Employment and social inclusion:  
Which are the main tendencies and indicators of gender discrimination on workplaces? Which 
are the actual conditions in which women work, and what are the internal cleavages (i.e., 
informal vs formal work; public vs private sector) that mostly differentiate women’s position 
in the labour market? What are social welfare measures women can count on (maternity 
leave…)? What is the difference between formal rights and the actual situation on the ground 
(it is likely to see differences here according to national history and the different experience 
with colonialism)? How do young women deal with the opportunities and constraints in this 
field, while constructing their biographical projects?  
 
 
Political participation and mobilization (WP3):  
Is there anything specific to women’s political participation and mobilisation? What about 
intra-generational cooperation? What about conservative women’s groups? This is relatively 
understudies in ME Studies, and would deserve much more attention (Muslim Sisters in 
Egypt…). In the case of some countries under investigation, we had a bold ‘state feminism’ 
under previous administrations. Do you see any difference in the conceptualisation and 
practice of feminism, after the Arab Uprisings? 
 
 
Youth cultures and values (WP4):  
Is there anything specific to women’s youth cultures and values? What are the issues debated?  
How are the changes in the social condition of young men and women (compared with the 
previous generation) mirrored at the cultural level? Do they leave to new social expectations 
and norms that guide the behaviours and role for young men, and women, in society? Which 
is their impact on young women’s identity and role? To what extent do young women drawn 
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upon, or rather contest, the prevailing visions of femininity and female roles, rooted in the 
dominant cultural and religious values, as strongly associated with motherhood, care work 
and marriage? What kind of values and orientation do women express in relation to work, 
education formation of a family and motherhood? What kind of value and relevance do they 
attribute to these personal goals and life choices, to these different parts of their biographical 
projects? Do their expectations and identities continue to be construct around family roles 
(mothering, marriage) or also around public roles (education, work, political participation)? 
Which are the differences and continuities with the previous generations? Are new gender 
models and identity arising in younger female generations? 
 
 
Which are the changes in the gender relations that young men and women are experiencing in 
their everyday life? To what extent and how the social representations, norms and values, and 
cultural models around masculinity and femininity are changing in younger generations, 
compared with adult generations?  
Which impact have ICT in the everyday life of young women, do they open up new 
possibilities for action, autonomy, self-determination – or, on the contrary, make room or new 
forms of social control – etc?  [sources for this: Arab Barometer, WWS…] 
 
 
International Migration and Mobility (WP6):  
as outlined in our background paper on youth culture, migration and the ‘circulation’ of 
cultures are very relevant dimensions we should examine. What kind of values migrant 
women transfer? What is the role of Diaspora politics when it comes to lobby for women’s 
rights ‘back home’? Conversely, how do migrants’ influx impact on SEM countries and 
gender roles? 
 
Public Policies (WP7):  
Policy-making is an underexplored issue in Middle Eastern Studies. There is no study today 
about, for instance, the policy-making process of public policies. It would be very innovative 
to ‘follow’ a women’s organisation in its negotiation (if any) of some gender-related policies. 
Another important level of analysis regards the impact of gendered-related policies and laws. 
A first, relevant focus here regards policies and interventions against gender-based violence. 
How these politics are developing in the region and in the different countries? Which are their 
effects, in terms of their ability to reducing or controlling the level of violence, and in terms of 
their impact on the social perception of gender violence (e.g a public or private concern, a 
socially legitimized practices or not, etc)?  
A second and broader aspect concerns the impact of laws and policies establishing and 
fostering gender equality: to what extent do these policies succeed in changing the social 
representation related to the women’s role in family and society? How the representations and 
values related to gender relations and to the social role of women are changing among 
younger generation (boys and girls), as effect of these legislative reforms?  
 
Sources and databases on the topic:   
http://data.worldbank.org/ 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/data 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ 
genderstats.org  
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The SAHWA Project (“Researching Arab 
Mediterranean Youth: Towards a New Social 
Contract”) is a FP-7 interdisciplinary 
cooperative research project led by the 
Barcelona Centre for International Affairs 
(CIDOB) and funded by the European 
Commission. It brings together fifteen 
partners from Europe and Southern and 
Eastern Mediterranean countries to research 
youth prospects and perspectives in a 
context of multiple social, economic and 
political transitions in five Arab countries 
(Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt and 
Lebanon). The project expands over 2014-
2016 and has a total budget of €3.1 million. 
The thematic axis around which the project 
will revolve are education, employment and 
social inclusion, political mobilization and 
participation, culture and values, international 
migration and mobility, gender, comparative 
experiences in other transition contexts and 
public policies and international cooperation. 
 
 
 
 
 
